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Abstract. This paper studies how confidentiality properties of multi-
threaded programs can be verified efficiently by a combination of newly
developed and existing model checking algorithms. In particular, we
study the verification of scheduler-specific observational determinism
(SSOD), a property that characterizes secure information flow for multi-
threaded programs under a given scheduler. Scheduler-specificness allows
us to reason about refinement attacks, an important and tricky class of
attacks that are notorious in practice. SSOD imposes two conditions:
(SSOD-1) all individual public variables have to evolve deterministically,
expressed by requiring stuttering equivalence between the traces of each
individual public variable, and (SSOD-2) the relative order of updates of
public variables is coincidental, i.e., there always exists a matching trace.
We verify the first condition by reducing it to the question whether all
traces of each public variable are stuttering equivalent. To verify the sec-
ond condition, we show how the condition can be translated, via a series
of steps, into a standard strong bisimulation problem. Our verification
techniques can be easily adapted to verify other formalizations of similar
information flow properties.
We also exploit counter example generation techniques to synthesize at-
tacks for insecure programs that fail either SSOD-1 or SSOD-2, i.e., show-
ing how confidentiality of programs can be broken.
1 Introduction
Finding ways to guarantee confidentiality of applications remains a difficult, but
highly important task. Applications such as Internet banking, medical informa-
tion systems, and authentication systems need to enforce strict protection of
private data, e.g., credit card details, medical records etc. In particular, private
information should not be derivable from public data1. For example, the pro-
gram if (h > 0) then l := 0 else l := 1, where h is a private variable and l
is a public variable, leaks secret information, since we can derive the value of h
1 For simplicity, throughout this paper, we consider a simple two-point security lattice,
where the data is divided into two disjoint subsets, of private (high) and public (low)
security levels, respectively.
from the value of l. If private data is not sufficiently protected, users refuse to use
such applications. Using formal means to establish confidentiality is a promising
way to gain the trust of users.
Various techniques are capable of modeling and analyzing the confidentiality
property. Classical approaches are typically based on type systems (see [34] for
an overview): if a program can be typed, it ensures secure information flow. Type
systems are efficient, but imprecise, and also reject many innocuous programs.
Therefore, recent work on adopting techniques from model checking [8, 15,
24] is emerging as an alternative approach to gain better precision. An inter-
esting challenge is to extend these results to the multi-threaded case. This is
important, since with the development of multiple cores on a chip and massively
parallel systems like general-purpose graphic processing units, multi-threading
is becoming the standard. However, this is also a challenge, for two reasons.
First of all, the formalization of confidentiality for multi-threaded programs is
not easy. The outcomes of multi-threaded programs depend on the scheduling
policy. Moreover, because of the interactions between threads and the exchange
of intermediate results, we should take into account intermediate results in the
model of observations [44, 24, 23]. Existing confidentiality properties, such as
noninterference [18] and observational determinism [44, 24] only consider input-
output behavior, and ignore the role of schedulers. Thus, they are not suitable
to ensure confidentiality for multi-threaded programs. New definitions of confi-
dentiality have to be developed for an observational model where an attacker
can access the full code of the program, observe the traces of public data, and
limit the set of possible program traces by selecting a scheduler.
The second challenge is, given an appropriate confidentiality property, to
develop an efficient and precise verification algorithm for the property. While
various, subtly different approaches to formalize multi-threaded confidentiality
have been proposed [33, 44, 24, 39, 22], efficient verification techniques for these
properties are still lacking. Therefore, this paper develops methods to verify
these important information flow properties by combining newly developed and
existing model checking algorithms.
Observational Determinism. This paper studies the verification of scheduler-
specific observational determinism (SSOD). This is a formalization of the se-
cure information flow requirements for multi-threaded programs. As observed
by Roscoe [33], for a multi-threaded program, not to leak information about pri-
vate data, its public data have to behave deterministically. We formalized this as
SSOD. In contrast to other formalizations of observational determinism, SSOD
explicitly considers the scheduler that is used to execute the program. Indeed,
due to the interactions between threads, data traces of a multi-threaded program
depend on the scheduling policy. Therefore, the program’s confidentiality is only
guaranteed under a particular scheduler. A different scheduler might make the
program reveal secret information, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1.
{if (h > 0) then l1 := 1 else l2 := 1}∣∣∣∣{l1 := 1; l2 := 1}∣∣∣∣{l2 := 1; l1 := 1};
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where
∣∣∣∣ is the parallel operator. Under the uniform scheduler, i.e., a scheduler
that chooses threads uniformly and thus all possible interleavings of threads are
considered, the secret information cannot be derived, since the traces in the cases
h > 0 and h ≤ 0 are the same. However, under a scheduler that always executes
the leftmost thread first, the secret information is revealed by observing whether
l1 is updated before l2, i.e., when it is so, the attacker knows that h > 0.
Since we assume that an attacker knows the full source code of the program,
if he chooses an appropriate scheduler, secret information can be revealed from
the limited set of possible traces. This sort of attack is called a refinement attack
[34, 8], since the choice of the scheduling policy refines the set of possible program
traces. Therefore, by formulating a confidentiality requirement that is paramet-
ric over the scheduling policy allows to qualify which scheduler (or classes of
schedulers) can be used to securely execute a program.
SSOD imposes two requirements on the possible behaviors of a program:
– (SSOD-1) each public variable has to evolve deterministically. This is cap-
tured by requiring that, for any two initial states I and I ′ that are indis-
tinguishable w.r.t. the public variables, all possible traces of a single public
variable starting in I and I ′ are stuttering equivalent; and
– (SSOD-2) the relative order of updates of public variables is coincidental.
This is captured by requiring that for any two initial states I and I ′ that are
indistinguishable w.r.t. the public variables, and for every trace starting in
I, there exists a trace that is stuttering equivalent w.r.t. all public variables,
starting in I ′.
SSOD is scheduler-specific, since traces model the runs of a program under a
particular scheduler. When the scheduling policy changes, some traces cannot
occur, and also, some new traces might appear ; thus the new set of traces may not
respect our requirements. For example, the above program is accepted by SSOD
w.r.t. the uniform scheduler, but is rejected under the scheduler that always
executes the leftmost thread first.
Notice that the question which classes of schedulers appropriately model
real-life attacks is orthogonal to our results: our definition is parametric on the
scheduler. In [23], we compare SSOD with the existing formalizations of confi-
dentiality properties [44, 24, 39], and argue that they are either unsuitable to the
multi-threaded context, or more restrictive than SSOD.
Verification. To verify SSOD, we extract a Kripke structure from the execution
of a program under the control of a scheduler, in a standard way. To check our
first requirement, we reduce it to the problem of verifying whether all traces of
each public variable of a certain Kripke structure are stuttering equivalent. Our
algorithm to verify all-trace stuttering equivalence is implemented by checking
whether there exists a functional bisimulation between the Kripke structure and
a witness trace. This is a new algorithm, that is also relevant outside the security
context, e.g., as in partial-order reduction for model checking, since stuttering
equivalence is a fundamental concept in the theory of concurrent and distributed
systems [6].
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Our second requirement reduces to check the stuttering trace equivalence be-
tween two Kripke structures. To check this, we first remove stuttering steps, and
then determinize two Kripke structures. Next, we check whether these two de-
terministic and stuttering-free Kripke structure are strongly bisimilar. Our veri-
fication is based on the well-known fact that in deterministic and stuttering-free
Kripke structures, trace equivalence and strong bimisimulation coincides [16].
Our approach gives a precise verification method for confidentiality. We would
like to stress that other formalizations of observational determinism [44, 24, 39]
can also be verified by a minor modification of our algorithms.
Another advantage of using model checking techniques to verify information
flow properties is that we can synthesize attacks for insecure programs, based
on counter example generation techniques. Since the verification algorithm is
precise, if it fails, a counter example can be produced, describing a possible
attack on the security of the program. This paper describes how the verifica-
tion algorithms can be instrumented to produce these counter examples. We
believe that our idea of applying counter example generation to synthesize at-
tacks for confidentiality property of multi-threaded programs has not previously
been mentioned in literature.
Currently, we are implementing our verification techniques in the symbolic
model checker LTSmin [10]. The algorithms are implemented, and we are now
applying the implementation to case studies.
The formal definition of SSOD, and the comparison with other formaliza-
tions of observational determinism in the literature, has been published before
in FoVeOOs [23, 22] and has also been presented at SecCo 20112. However, in this
earlier version, we used a different verification technique: characterizing SSOD
as a temporal logic formula that leads to a model checking problem of very
high complexity. This paper proposes more efficient algorithms. Both verifica-
tion algorithms and the attack synthesis in this paper have not been published
before. The algorithm to check SSOD-1 borrows ideas from the one we developed
for the verification of scheduler-specific probabilistic observational determinism
(SSPOD), a probabilistic version of SSOD [30], but it solves a completely different
problem: SSOD-1 checks if all traces are stuttering equivalent, while SSPOD-1
in essence checks that all traces are stuttering equivalent with probability 1.
Organization of the paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
After the preliminaries in Section 2, Section 3 presents a formal definition of
SSOD. Section 4 discusses the algorithms to verify the property. Section 5 dis-
cusses the attack synthesis. Finally, Sections 6, and 7 discuss related work, and
conclusions.




Let X be an arbitrary set. The sets of all finite sequences, and all sequences of
X are denoted by X∗, and Xω, respectively. The empty sequence is denoted by
ε. Given a sequence σ ∈ X∗, we denote its last element by last(σ). A sequence
ρ ∈ X∗ is called a prefix of σ, denoted by ρ v σ, if there exists another sequence
ρ′ ∈ Xω such that ρρ′ = σ.
2.2 Kripke Structures
Kripke structures are a standard way to model programs semantics [26]. Basi-
cally, Kripke structures are graphs where nodes represent states of the system
and edges represent transitions between states. Each state may enable several
transitions, modeling different execution orders to be determined by a scheduler.
State labels equip each state with the relevant information about that state. For
technical convenience, our Kripke structures label states with arbitrary-valued
variables from a set Var , rather than with Boolean-valued atomic propositions.
Thus, each state c is labeled by a function (valuation) V (c) : Var → Val that
assigns a value V (c)(v) ∈ Val to each variable v ∈ Var . We assume that Var is
partitioned into sets of low variables L and high variables H , i.e., Var = L∪H ,
with L ∩H = ∅.
Definition 1 (Kripke structure). A Kripke structure A is a tuple 〈S, I,Var ,
Val , V,→〉 consisting of (i) a set S of states, (ii) an initial state I ∈ S, (iii) a
finite set of variables Var, (iv) a countable set of values Val, (v) a labeling
function V : S → (Var → Val), (vi) a transition relation →⊆ S × S. We
assume that → is non-blocking, i.e., ∀c ∈ S. ∃c′ ∈ S. c→ c′.
Given a set Var ′ ⊆ Var , the projection A |Var′ of A on Var ′, restricts the labeling
function V to labels in Var ′. Thus, we obtain A |Var′ from A by replacing V by
V |Var′ : S → (Var ′ → Val).
Semantics of programs. A program C over a variable set Var can be expressed
as a Kripke structure AC in a standard way: The states of AC are tuples 〈C, s〉
consisting of a program fragment C and a valuation s : Var → Val . The transi-
tion relation → follows the small-step semantics of C. If a program terminates
in a state c, we include a special transition c→ c, i.e., a self-loop, ensuring that
AC is non-blocking. In the remainder of this paper, we leave out the superscript
C whenever this is clear from the context.
Paths and traces. A path pi in A is an infinite sequence pi = c0c1c2 . . . such that
(i) ci ∈ S, c0 = I, and (ii) for all i ∈ N, ci → ci+1. We define Path(A) as the set
of all infinite paths of A; and Path∗(A) = {pi′ v pi | pi ∈ Path(A)} as the set of
all finite paths in Path(A).
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The trace T of a path pi records the valuations along pi. Formally, T = trace(pi)
= V (c0)V (c1)V (c2) . . .. Trace T is a lasso iff it ends in a loop, i.e., if T = T0 . . . Ti
(Ti+1 . . . Tn)
ω, where (Ti+1 . . . Tn)
ω denotes a loop. Let Trace(A) denote the set
of all infinite traces of A. Two states c and c′ are low-equivalent, denoted c ∼L c′,
iff V (c) |L = V (c
′) |L . Over a trace T , we let T |l and T |L denote the projections
of T on a low variable l and the set of low variables L, respectively.
2.3 Schedulers
A multi-threaded program executes threads from the set of non-terminated
threads, i.e., the live threads. During the execution, a scheduling policy repeat-
edly decides which thread is picked to proceed next. A scheduler is a function
that implements a scheduling policy [35]. To make our security property appli-
cable for many schedulers, we give a general definition. We allow a scheduler
to use the full history of computation to make decisions: given a path ending
in some state c, a scheduler δ which determines a set of the possible successor
states Q is formally defined as follows,
Definition 2. A scheduler δ for a Kripke structure A = 〈S, I,Var ,Val , V,→〉
is a function δ : Path∗(A) → 2S , such that, for all finite paths pi ∈ Path∗(A),
if δ(pi) = Q ⊆ S then last(pi) can take a transition to any c ∈ Q. Given pi, we
write c0 → c1 → c2 . . .→ cn if ci ∈ δ(c0 . . . ci−1) for all 1 ≤ i < |pi|..
The effect of a scheduler δ on A can be described by Aδ: the set of states
of Aδ is obtained by unrolling the paths in A, i.e., SAδ = Path∗(A) such that
states of Aδ contain a full history of execution. Besides, the unreachable states
of A under the scheduler δ are removed by the transition relation →δ.
Definition 3. Let A = 〈S, I,Var ,Val , V,→〉 be a Kripke structure and let δ be a
scheduler for A. The Kripke structure associated to δ is Aδ = 〈Path∗(A), I,Var ,
Val , Vδ,→δ〉, where Vδ : Path∗(A)×Var → Val is given by Vδ(pi) = V (last(pi)),
and the transition relation is given by pi →δ pic iff c ∈ δ(pi), i.e., Aδ can transition
from a path pi to a path pic if δ enables scheduling state c after pi.
2.4 Stuttering-free Kripke Structures and Stuttering Equivalence
Stuttering steps and stuttering equivalence [32, 24] are the basic ingredients of
our confidentiality properties.
Definition 4 (Stuttering-free Kripke structure). A stuttering step is a
transition c → c′ that leaves the labels unchanged, i.e., V (c′) = V (c). A Kripke
structure is called stuttering free if c→ c′ and V (c) = V (c′) imply c = c′ and c
is a final state, i.e., stuttering steps are only allowed as self-loops in final states.
Two sequences are stuttering equivalent if they are the same after we remove
adjacent occurrences of the same label, e.g., (aaabcccd)ω and (abbcddd)ω.
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Definition 5 (Stuttering equivalence). Let X be a set. Stuttering equiva-
lence, denoted ∼, is the largest equivalence relation over Xω ×Xω such that for
all T, T ′ ∈ Xω,a, b ∈ X. aT ∼ bT ′ ⇒ a = b ∧ (T ∼ T ′ ∨ aT ∼ T ′ ∨ T ∼ bT ′).
A set Y ⊆ X is closed under stuttering equivalence if T ∈ Y ∧ T ∼ T ′ imply
T ′ ∈ Y .
3 Scheduler-Specific Observational Determinism
A program is confidential w.r.t. a particular scheduler iff no secret information
can be derived from the observation of public data traces, or from the ordering
of public data updates. This is captured formally by the definition of scheduler-
specific observational determinism.
As shown in [44, 23], to be secure, a multi-threaded program must impose
an order on the accesses to a single low variable, i.e., the sequence of operations
performed at a single low variable must be deterministic. Therefore, SSOD’s first
condition requires that any two traces of each low variable from any two initial
low-equivalent state I1 and I2 are stuttering equivalent. This condition ensures
that no secret information can be derived from the observation of public data
traces. Indeed, when each low variable individually evolves deterministically, the
values of low variables are independent of the values of high variables. Notice
that requiring only the existence of a single matching low variable trace is not
sufficient, as shown in the following example,
Example 2. Consider the following program, where h is a Boolean,
if (h) then {l := 0; l := 1} || l := 0 else {l := 0; l := 1} || {l := 0; l := 0};
This program leaks information under the uniform scheduler: if h is 1, then l is
more likely to contain 1 than 0 in final states. However, there always exists a
matching low location trace for l. Therefore, we require instead that traces of
each low variable must be deterministic. This deterministic property of traces
also avoids cache attacks, i.e., attacks that exploit the timing behavior of threads
via the cache to derive secret information [44].
It should be noted that a consequence of SSOD-1 is that innocuous pro-
grams such as l:=0| l:=1 are also rejected, since its set of traces cannot be
distinguished from the traces of Example 2.
Notice that the transition relation of the Kripke structure is non-blocking,
i.e., there is a self-loop at each final state. Thus, the attacker cannot detect
termination. However, the termination leaks are avoided, since SSOD requires
stuttering equivalence between traces, instead of stuttering and prefixing equiv-
alence as in [44, 39]. Huisman et al. analyzed this point in detail in [24].
SSOD also requires that, given any two initial low-equivalent states I and
I ′, for every trace starting in I, there exists a trace that is stuttering equivalent
w.r.t. all low variables, starting in I ′. The second condition of SSOD requires
the existence of a matching public data trace. This existential condition avoids
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refinement attacks where an attacker chooses an appropriate scheduler to control
the set of possible traces. The second condition also ensures that the relative
orders of updates of low variables are coincidental. Thus, no information can be
deduced from them.
Formally, SSOD is defined as follows,
Definition 6 (SSOD). For any two initial low-equivalent states I and I ′, let
Aδ and A′δ denote two Kripke structures corresponding to I and I ′, respectively.
Given a scheduler δ, a program C respects SSOD w.r.t. L and δ, iff
SSOD-1 ∀T ∈ Trace(Aδ), T ′ ∈ Trace(A′δ), l ∈ L. T |l ∼ T ′ |l ,
SSOD-2 ∀T ∈ Trace(Aδ). ∃T ′ ∈ Trace(A′δ). T |L ∼ T ′ |L .
A program C is scheduler-specific observational deterministic w.r.t. a set of
schedulers ∆ if it is so w.r.t. any scheduler δ ∈ ∆.
4 Algorithmic Verification
This section discusses how we algorithmically verify the two conditions of SSOD.
As mentioned above, we use a combination of new and existing algorithms. The
new algorithm is general, and also applicable in other, non-security related con-
texts. We assume that data domains are finite and schedulers use finite memory.
Therefore, the algorithms work only on finite Kripke structures.
We first simplify SSOD by replacing SSOD-1 with SSOD-1A. Intuitively,
SSOD-1A requires that, given a Kripke structure A that corresponds to any
initial state, after projecting on l, all traces are stuttering equivalent,
SSOD-1A ∀l ∈ L. T, T ′ ∈ Trace(Aδ). T |l ∼ T ′ |l .
The new condition SSOD-1A and SSOD-2 are equivalent to SSOD-1 and SSOD-2.
Theorem 1. If a program is scheduler-specific observational deterministic w.r.t.
L and a scheduler δ, then SSOD-1 & SSOD-2 ⇔ SSOD-1A & SSOD-2.
Proof. 1. SSOD-1 & SSOD-2 ⇒ SSOD-1A
Given any two traces T1, T2 ∈ Trace(Aδ), and any T ′ ∈ Trace(A′δ). Ac-
cording to SSOD-1, ∀l ∈ L, T1 |l ∼ T ′ |l ∧ T2 |l ∼ T ′ |l . Therefore, we can
conclude that ∀l ∈ L. T1 |l ∼ T2 |l .
2. SSOD-1A & SSOD-2 ⇒ SSOD-1
Given any traces T ∈ Trace(Aδ), T ′ ∈ Trace(A′δ). According to SSOD-2,
there exists a trace T ′′ ∈ Trace(A′δ) such that T |L ∼ T ′′ |L . If T |L ∼ T ′′ |L ,
then ∀l ∈ L. T |l ∼ T ′′ |l . According to SSOD-1A, ∀l ∈ L, T ′ |l ∼ T ′′ |l , then
∀l ∈ L. T |l ∼ T ′ |l . 
Let Aδ |l and Aδ |L represent the projections of Aδ on the label sets l and
L, respectively. Since {T |l | T ∈ Trace(Aδ)} = Trace(Aδ |l) and {T |L | T ∈
Trace(Aδ)} = Trace(Aδ |L), properties SSOD-1A and SSOD-2 can easily be re-
formulated over these Kripke structures as follows.
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SSOD-1K ∀l ∈ L. T, T ′ ∈ Trace(Aδ |l). T ∼ T ′,
SSOD-2K ∀T ∈ Trace(Aδ |L). ∃T ′ ∈ Trace(A′δ |L). T ∼ T ′.
Thus, SSOD-1K requires that for all l ∈ L, all traces of Aδ |l are stuttering
equivalent, while SSOD-2K requires stuttering trace equivalence between Aδ |L
and A′δ |L .
4.1 Verification of SSOD-1K
Given a program C, and a scheduler δ, SSOD-1K requires that after projecting
Aδ on any low variable l, all traces must be stuttering equivalent. To verify
this, we pick one arbitrary trace and ensure that all other traces are stuttering
equivalent to this trace. Concretely, for each l ∈ L, we carry out the following
steps. (Figures 1, 2 on page 14 provide an elaborate illustration of these steps.)
Algorithm 1: SSOD-1K on l
1: Project Aδ on l, yielding Aδ |l .
2: Identify all divergent states of Aδ |l . A state c of A is divergent if there
exists a trace such that all states following c are equivalent to c.
3: Check whether all traces of Aδ |l are stuttering equivalent by:
3.1: Choose a witness trace by:
3.1.1: Take an arbitrary lasso T of Aδ |l .
3.1.2: Remove stuttering steps and minimize T .
3.2: Check stuttering trace equivalence between Aδ |l and T by check-
ing if there exists a functional bisimulation between them.
Notice that the following algorithms can be applied to any Kripke struc-
ture, i.e., independent of the scheduling policy. Thus, instead of the notation Aδ
indicating a specific scheduler, we use a general notation A.
Step 1 is done by labeling every state with the value of l in that state.
Step 2 identifies all divergent states of a Kripke structure A. Before describing
the algorithm for Step 2, we first derive two lemmas that follow directly from
the definition of a divergent state (given in Step 2 of Algorithm 1).
Lemma 1. If state c has a stuttering loop or a self-loop, c is divergent.
Lemma 2. Assume that c has no self-loop or no stuttering loop. Then, state c
is divergent iff c has a divergent equivalent successor.
Step 2 is implemented by exploring state space of a Kripke structure A and
determining whether each reachable state is divergent or not. The state space of
A is explored in a breadth first search order (BFS). Let Pred(A, c) and Succ(A, c)
denote the set of all direct predecessors and successors of c, respectively, i.e.,
Pred(A, c) = {b ∈ S| b → c} and Succ(A, c) = {d ∈ S|c → d}. Let c ∼V c′
denote that c and c′ have the same valuation, i.e., V (c) = V (c′).
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The algorithm to identify divergent states of A uses two queues: Q and
Non Diver Q, and two maps: Divergent and Checked . The queue Q stores the
set of frontier states of the exploration. Initially, Divergent indicates the number
of stuttering transitions of each state, i.e., Divergent [c] = 3 indicates that c is
equivalent to three of its successors. During the execution, the algorithm changes
the values in Divergent . When the algorithm terminates, the value of Divergent [c]
will indicate whether c is divergent or not, i.e., iff Divergent [c] = 0, c is non-
divergent. The queue Non Diver Q stores non-divergent states, i.e., all reachable
state c such that Divergent [c] = 0. The Checked indicates that whether a state
has been checked or not, i.e., true or false.
The algorithm works as follows. States of A are explored by a BFS (lines 6-12
in Algorithm 2). For each explored state c, the number of its direct stuttering
transitions is stored in Divergent [c] (line 11). If c has no outgoing stuttering
transition, i.e., Divergent [c] = 0, it is clear that c is non-divergent (line 12).
For any c such that Divergent [c] = 0, for each predecessor b of c such that c
is reached from b by a stuttering transition, the algorithm decreases the value
Divergent [b] by 1 (lines 13-18). The idea is to remove the number of non-divergent
equivalent successors out of the value Divergent [b] of a state b. Finally, when
Divergent is stable, the value Divergent [b] will indicate whether b is divergent
or not, i.e., if b has a divergent equivalent successor, i.e., Divergent [b] 6= 0, b is
divergent (due to Lemma 2).
For example, assume that b is a direct predecessor of a non-divergent c, and
b has only one stuttering transition, which goes to c, i.e., Divergent [b] = 1. Since
c is non-divergent, according to Lemma 2, b is also non-divergent. Due to the
algorithm, the value of Divergent [b] is decreased by 1; and thus becomes 0, which
indicates that b is non-divergent.
Algorithm 2: Identify Divergent States (A)
// Initialization
1. for all states c ∈ S do
2. Checked [c]:=false;
3. Divergent [c]:=0;
4. Q := empty queue(); enqueue(Q, init state);
5. Non Diver Q := empty queue();
// Explore state space by BFS
6. enqueue(Q, init state); Checked [init state] := true;
7. while !empty(Q) do
8. current := dequeue(Q);
9. for all states c ∈ Succ(A, current) and ¬Checked [c] do
10. enqueue(Q, c); Checked [c] := true;
// Record the number of stuttering successors
11. Divergent [current ] := |{c ∈ Succ(A, current) | c ∼V current}|;
12. if Divergent [current ] = 0 then enqueue(Non Diver Q, current);
// Propagate non-divergence backwards
13. while !empty(Non Diver Q) do
14. current := dequeue(Non Diver Q);
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15. for all states b ∈ Pred(A, current) do
16. if b ∼V current and Divergent [b] 6= 0 then
17. Divergent [b] := Divergent [b]− 1;
18. if Divergent [b] = 0 then enqueue(Non Diver Q, b);
// Normalize divergence
19. for all states c ∈ S do
20. if Divergent [c] 6= 0 then Divergent [c] := true
21. else Divergent [c] := false;
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 identifies divergent states of a Kripke structure A.
Proof. Algorithm 2 always terminates, since A is finite. Two queues Q and
Non Diver Q ensure that each state and each edge of A are processed at most
once in each while loop. Thus, the time complexity of this algorithm is linear in
the size of A
We show that the second while loop correctly determines the divergent prop-
erty of each state. We first discuss its loop invariant Inv :
If a state c is divergent, Divergent [c] 6= 0.
Initially, the value of Divergent [c] is the number of stuttering successors of
c. If c is divergent, according to the definition of divergent state, it must have
at least one stuttering successor, i.e., Divergent [c] 6= 0. Thus, clearly, Inv holds
upon the first entry of the loop.
We show that the invariant is preserved by every iteration of the loop. Assume
Inv holds before the loop body. Consider a divergent state c. Due to the invariant,
Divergent [c] 6= 0 holds before the execution of the loop.
Suppose that the value of Divergent [c] has been decreased by 1 in the itera-
tion, i.e., c has a stuttering successor d with Divergent [d] = 0.
– Case c has a self-loop. In that case, c has at least two stuttering successors:
one of them is itself. Therefore, the invariant is preserved after the iteration,
since Divergent [c] ≥ 2 before the iteration.
– Case c has a stuttering loop. States in a stuttering loop always have at least
one stuttering successor. Since they are connected in a loop, their Divergent
values never become 0. Since Divergent [d] = 0, d must be outside the stutter-
ing loop. Thus, c has at least two stuttering successors before the iteration.
The invariant is preserved.
– If c has no self-loop or no stuttering loop, according to Lemma 2, c must
have a divergent stuttering successor e. Since the invariant is true before the
iteration, Divergent [e] 6= 0. Hence, d and e are not the same state. Thus, c
has at least two stuttering successors. The invariant is preserved.
Thus, Inv is a loop invariant. Therefore, Inv holds after termination: if c is
divergent, Divergent [c] 6= 0. In other words, any c such that Divergent [c] = 0 is
non-divergent.
Additionally, we show the following post-condition: if the algorithm ter-
minates, and if c is non-divergent, then Divergent [c] = 0.
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If c is non-divergent, all traces starting in c must pass a state that is not
equivalent to c. Let C denote the set of equivalent states that are reachable from
c only via stuttering transitions. To define C formally, we define the stuttering-
closure Stut(Q) of a subset Q ⊆ S,
Q0 = Q,
∀n ≥ 0. Qn+1 = {c′ ∈ S | ∃c ∈ Qn. c→ c′ ∧ c ∼V c′}.
We define Stut(Q) = ∪nQn. This is formally defined as an infinite union, but it
is actually a finite union; since there are at most a finite number of states in S.
Therefore, formally, C = Stut(c).
There must exist a state c′ ∈ C such that initially, Divergent [c′] = 0, i.e.,
c′ only connects to states outside C. Otherwise, a contradiction occurs: assume
that initially, ∀c′ ∈ C, Divergent [c′] 6= 0, i.e., all states have at least a stuttering
successor. Since the set C is finite, if all states of C have stuttering successors,
there must exist a stuttering loop inside C. Hence, c is divergent due to Lemma 1;
and this is a contradiction, since we assume that c is non-divergent.
Let D0 denote the set of states c
′ ∈ C such that initially, Divergent [c′] = 0.
Notice that the algorithm changes the Divergent value of states. Let D0 denote
the set of states of C such that currently, their Divergent values are 0. Initially,
D0 = D0.
Consider the set of direct predecessors of D0. We claim that there must exist
a state c′′ in this set of predecessors such that initially, Divergent [c′′] is equal to
the number of its successors c′ with Divergent [c′] = 0, i.e, Divergent [c′′] = |{c′ ∈
Succ(A, c′′) | c′ ∼V c′′ ∧Divergent [c′] = 0}|. If not, the contradiction occurs by
the same argument, i.e., there exists a stuttering loop. Let D1 denote the set of
direct predecessors c′′ of D0 such that initially, Divergent [c′′] = 1. According to
the algorithm, the Divergent values of states in D1 are decreased by 1. Thus,
after a few iterations, the Divergent values of all states in D1 become 0, i.e.,
D0 = D0 ∪D1.
Therefore, by a similar argument, the Divergent values of other states, e.g.,
the predecessors of D0 with the Divergent value 2, also become 0; and so on.
The set D0 gradually grows, and at the termination, D0 = C. Therefore, when
the algorithm terminates, if c is non-divergent, Divergent [c] = 0. This is also
equivalent that if Divergent [c] 6= 0, c is divergent. 
Step 3: Step 3.1.1 is implemented via a classical cycle-detection algorithm based
on depth-first search. The initial state of a lasso is also the initial state of the
Kripke structure. The algorithm essentially proceeds by picking arbitrary next
steps, and terminates when it hits a state that was picked before.
Algorithm 3: Lasso T of A
for all states c ∈ S do Visit [c] := false;
index := 0;
current := init state;
for (; ; ) do
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T [index ] := current ; // Implement T as an array
index := index + 1;
if Visit [current ] = true then break;
Visit [current ] := true;
current := some state c ∈ Succ(A, current);
return(T , position of current in T );
In this algorithm, we use a map Visit to indicate visited states of A, i.e.,
Visit [current ] = true indicates that current has been visited before. Clearly,
this algorithm returns a trace of A. Moreover, it always terminates, because A
is finite and there is a self-loop at every final state.
Step 3.1.2 is done via the standard strong bisimulation reduction [9]. For
example, the minimal form of a lasso abb(cb)ω is a(bc)ω. This minimal lasso
is called the witness trace. Except the final state, all states of the witness trace
are set to be non-divergent.
Step 3.2 checks stuttering trace equivalence between a Kripke structure A
and the witness trace T by checking if there exists a functional bisimulation
between them, i.e., a bisimulation that is a function, thus mapping each state
in A to a single state in T . This is done by exploring the state space of A
in a breadth-first search (BFS) order and building the mapping Map during
exploration. We name each state in T by a unique symbol u ∈ U , i.e., ui denotes
Ti. Let Succ(T, u) denote the successor of u on T .
We map A’s initial state to u0, i.e., Map[init state] = u0 (line 4 in Algorithm
4). Each iteration of the algorithm examines the successors of the state stored
in the variable current (lines 6-8). Assume that Map[current ] is u, consider a
successor c ∈ Succ(A, current). The potential map of c is u if current → c is a
stuttering transition; otherwise, it is Succ(T, u) (line 9). The algorithm returns
false, i.e., continue = false, if (i) c and potential map have different valuations,
(ii) c and potential map have different divergent values, or (iii) c has been checked
before, but its mapped state is not potential map (line 10, 11, and 13).
If none of these cases occurs and c was not checked before, c is added to Q,
and mapped to potential map (line 12). Basically, a state c of A is mapped to
u, i.e., Map[c] = u, iff the trace from the initial state to state c in A and the
prefix of T up to u are stuttering equivalent.
Let final(A, c) denote that c is a final state in A; and final(T, u) denote that
u is the final state in T . The algorithm also uses a queue Q of frontier states.
The termination of the following algorithm follows from the termination of BFS
over a finite A.
Algorithm 4: All-Trace Stuttering Equivalence (A, T )
1. for all states c ∈ S do Map[c] := ⊥;
2. continue := true;
3. Q := empty queue(); enqueue(Q, init state);
4. Map[init state] := u0; // u0 is T0
5. while !empty(Q) ∧ continue do
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Q = [1, 2, 3]
Violation in state 1
Fig. 2: Step 3.2 of Algorithm 1 (i.e., Algorithm 4)
7. u := Map[current ];
8. for all states c ∈ Succ(A, current) do
9. potential map := (c ∼V current) ? u : Succ(T, u);
10. case c 6∼V potential map  continue := false;
11. [] Divergent [c] 6= Divergent [potential map]  continue := false;
12. [] Map[c] = ⊥  enqueue(Q, c); Map[c] := potential map;
13. [] Map[c] 6= potential map  continue := false;
14. return continue;
Example 3. Figure 1 illustrates Step 1 - Step 3.1 on a Kripke structure A con-
sisting of 10 states, numbered from 0 to 9. Step 1 shows a projection of A on a
low variable l where the symbols a, b, c etc. denote state contents, i.e., states
with the same value of l are represented by the same symbol. Step 2 identifies
divergent states by ∗. Step 3.1 takes an arbitrary trace of A and then minimizes
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it. Each state of the witness trace T is denoted by a unique symbol ui. Figure 2
illustrates Step 3.2. Initially, all states of A are mapped to a special symbol ⊥
that indicates unchecked states. To keep states readable, we skip the valuation.
Next, state 0 is enqueued, and mapped to u0. In the next step, the algorithm
examines all unchecked successors of state 0, i.e., states 1, 2, 3. Each of them
follows a non-stuttering step, thus their potential maps are all u1. State 1 is di-
vergent while potential map is not, thus, continue = false. SSOD-1K fails, since
there exists a trace that stutters in state 1 forever, and thus, A and T are not
stuttering trace equivalent. The algorithm terminates.
As a first step towards proving correctness, we prove that Algorithm 4 ensures
the following loop invariant.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 4 preserves the following loop invariant Inv:
If continue, then ∀c ∈ S such that Map[c] = u, the trace from init state to c
and the prefix of T up to u are stuttering equivalent, and if ¬continue, then
there exists a trace of A that is not stuttering equivalent to T .
Proof. Clearly, Inv holds upon the first entry of the loop, since initially, continue
holds, and only init state is mapped to the initial state of T , i.e., u0.
We show that the invariant is preserved by every iteration of the loop. Assume
that Stm holds before the loop body. If continue does not hold, then the loop
is not executed, and the algorithm ends. The invariant is preserved.
Otherwise, continue holds. The invariant before the loop body states that
the trace from init state to current and the prefix of T up to u are stuttering
equivalent. Now consider a successor c of current . We distinguish the following
cases:
Case c 6∼V u and c 6∼V Succ(T, u). Let potential map denote the mapping can-
didate of c. It is u if c ∼V current ; otherwise, it is Succ(T, u). If c 6∼V u and
c 6∼V Succ(T, u), then c 6∼V potential map. Thus, continue becomes false.
The invariant is preserved, since any trace that goes from current to c is not
stuttering equivalent to T .
Case c ∼V u or c ∼V Succ(T, u). Thus, c ∼V potential map. Now, we consider
the following cases:
Case Divergent [c] 6= Divergent [potential map]. If c is a divergent state ofA,
then there must be a trace that stutters in c forever, while T can evolve
from potential map to a state with a different valuation (or vice versa).
Thus, these two traces are not stuttering equivalent. Hence, continue
becomes false; and the invariant is preserved.
Case Divergent [c] = Divergent [potential map].
Case c is unchecked. Thus, Map[c] = ⊥. State c is added to Q, and
becomes a frontier state. Moreover, it is mapped to potential map.
It is easy to see that the trace from init state to c and the prefix of T
up to potential map are stuttering equivalent. Hence, the invariant
is preserved.
Case c is checked before. Thus, Map[c] 6= ⊥.
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Case Map[c] = potential map. State c has been explored before; the
algorithm does not explore it further. Since continue and Map
are not updated, the invariant is preserved.
Case Map[c] 6= potential map. Thus, continue becomes false. The
invariant is preserved, since there exist two traces that both lead
to c and in these two traces, c is mapped to two different states
of T ; thus, one of these two trace is not stuttering equivalent to
T . 
Theorem 4. Algorithm 4 returns true iff there exists a bisimulation between A
and T .
Proof. If Algorithm 4 returns false, it follows directly from the invariant that no
functional bisimulation exists. If it returns true, due to the loop invariant, we
can conclude that for any trace of A, e.g., T1, there exists a prefix of T that is
stuttering equivalent to T1. We show that T1 is actually stuttering equivalent
to the whole T .
Case T1 ends with a final state c. Assume that the algorithm maps c to
potential map. Since the algorithm is divergent-sensitive, and in T , the only
divergent state is the final state, thus potential map is also the final state of
T . Therefore, T1 and T are stuttering equivalent.
Case T1 ends with a non-stuttering loop that starts and ends in
state c. Thus, state c is investigated twice, and in the second visit, its
corresponding mapped state (of T ) must be the same as its mapped state in
the first visit; otherwise, the algorithm returned false. Hence, the c’s mapped
state is also the start and end of a loop that terminates T . Thus, T1 and T
are stuttering equivalent. 
Overall Complexity. Step 1 labels every state of A by the value of l in that
state. This is done in time complexity O(n), where n is the number of states
of A. Step 2 is based on BFS, thus its time complexity is O(n + m), where m
is the number of transitions of A. The time complexity of Step 3.1 to find a
witness trace is O(m). The core of Step 3.2 is also BFS, whose running time is
O(n+m). Therefore, for a single low variable l, the total time complexity of the
verification is linear in the size of A, i.e., O(n+m), and for any initial state, the
total complexity of the verification of SSOD-1K (for all l ∈ L) is |L| O(n + m).
If we put restrictions on the initial inputs, i.e., the number of initial states is
finite, the verification of SSOD-1K is feasible in practice.
4.2 Verification of SSOD-2K
SSOD-2K requires that, given two Kripke structures Aδ and A′δ that model the
executions of a program C from any two initial low-equivalent states I and I ′,
if we project them on the set of low variables L, Aδ |L and A′δ |L are stuttering
trace equivalent.
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To verify SSOD-2, our algorithm first transforms the Kripke structures into
two equivalent ones, without stuttering steps, and then determinizes them3. It
is well-known that, for deterministic and stuttering-free Kripke structures, trace
equivalence and strong bisimilarity coincide [16]. Therefore, we verify SSOD-2K
by combining several existing algorithms.
Algorithm 5: SSOD-2K
1: Project both Aδ and A′δ (modeling the executions starting in I and I ′)
on the set L, yielding Aδ |L and A′δ |L .
2: Remove all stuttering steps from Aδ |L and A′δ |L , yielding stuttering-free
Kripke structures Asfδ |L and A′sfδ |L .
3: Re-establish self-loops for final states of Asfδ |L and A′sfδ |L .
4: Determinize Asfδ |L and A′sfδ |L , yielding deterministic stuttering-free
Rδ |L and R′δ |L .
5: Combine Rδ |L and R′δ |L , yielding R+δ |L , and then compute all bisimula-
-rity equivalence classes of R+δ |L .
6: Check if I and I ′ are in the same bisimularity equivalence class.
Step 1 is done by labeling every state of a Kripke structure with the set of low
values L in that state. To remove the stuttering steps in Step 2, we compute
the stuttering closure of each state, using the standard all-pair shortest path
algorithm, and then collapse these components into a single state. To ensure
that the transition relation remains non-blocking, Step 3 re-establishes self-
loops for final states. Notice that A and Asf are stuttering trace equivalent,
since traces of Asf are traces of A, but all stuttering steps in traces have been
removed.
The determinization of a Kripke structure in Step 4 is obtained via the
well-known subset construction. Due to the property of determinization of finite
automata, Asf and R are trace equivalent. Notice that the determinization is
based on low events, i.e., operations of changing the values of low variables.
Thus, a state of R is a group of states in the original Kripke structure A that
are reached via the same low operation. Therefore, states of R have the same
label with their inside component states.
Step 5: Computing bisimularity equivalence classes. For deterministic
stuttering-free Kripke structures, trace equivalence and strong bisimilarity coin-
cide. To verify strong bisimilarity of R and R′, we first take the union of state
spaces of the two Kripke structures, denoted R+, and use the classic algorithm
for computing bisimilarity by Paige and Tarjan [31]. This is a standard algo-
rithm, and readers can refer to [31] for a detailed description of the algorithm.
However, since this step strongly relates to the next section where we synthesize
attacks for insecure programs, we represent briefly the algorithm’s main idea.
The algorithm for computing bisimularity equivalence classes exploits the
well-known partition-refinement technique [31]. The main idea of this technique
3 We refer to the determinism concept in automata theory [21].
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is to partition the state space into disjoint blocks of states, and to repeatedly
refine this partition: whenever we find that states of a block are not equivalent,
we split the block into separate blocks. If the partition is stable, i.e., it is not
necessary to refine it more, we terminate.
A partition P of S is a collection {Qi}i∈I of nonempty subsets of S such that⋃
iQi∈I = S and for any i
′ 6= i : Qi′ ∩Qi = ∅. The elements of a partition are
called blocks. Given a partition P, we say that another partition P ′ refines P, if
any block of P ′ is included in a block of P. We define P-equivalence as follows:
c ∼P c′ ⇔ ∃Q ∈ P. c ∈ Q ∧ c′ ∈ Q, i.e., intuitively, c and c′ are in the same
block.
The initial partition P0 is constructed by categorizing states with the same
valuation into blocks, i.e., c ∼P0 c′ ⇔ V (c) = V (c′). In the refinement step, we
split a block Q into two disjoint subblocks, one collects all states being able to
reach another block Q′, while the other collects all states that cannot reach Q′.
In this case, we call Q′ a splitter of Q. Partition P is stable w.r.t. a block Q′ if
there is no block Q ∈ P such that Q′ is a splitter of Q. P is stable if it is stable
w.r.t. all its blocks.
Step 6: Inclusion check. Finally, we check if two initial states I and I ′ are
in the same bisimularity equivalence class. This will indirectly answer whether
Rδ |L and R′δ |L are bisimilar, i.e., they are bisimilar if two initial states fall into
the same block, otherwise they are not.
Overall complexity. The stuttering closures in Step 2 can be computed in
O(n3) using the all-pair shortest path algorithm. However, improved algorithms
for doing so run in O(n2.376) [14].
The algorithm by Paige and Tarjan computes the partition corresponding to
strong bisimilarity in O(m · log n) [31]. Thus, the complexity of verifying SSOD-
2K is dominated by the determinization in Step 4, which is exponential in the
number of states. However, the worse case complexity is often reached in only
the extreme cases. Therefore, we believe that the verification of SSOD-2K is
feasible in practice.
5 Attack Synthesis for SSOD
Counter example generation is a powerful technique in model checking, with
many applications, such as diagnosis, scheduler synthesis, and debugging [13,
11, 20, 5]. This section presents counter example generation techniques for at-
tack synthesis. That is, if for a given scheduler, a program does not satisfy the
confidentiality requirements, we generate program traces that reveal the reason
why the confidentiality is broken.
5.1 Attack Synthesis for SSOD-1K
We propose to extend Algorithm 4 that checks SSOD-1K for counter example
























Fig. 3: Abnormal state
the witness trace when the Kripke structure does not satisfy SSOD-1K. These
two algorithms are similar. However, when a state that violates SSOD-1K is
found, Algorithm 6 does not terminate, as Algorithm 4 does, but continues until
it finds an unmatched trace. The unmatched trace is returned via Algorithm 8:
Trace Return given below.
State c is denoted as an unmatched state if it is not equivalent to its cor-
responding state potential map. State c is also unmatched if c is equivalent to
potential map, but c is divergent while potential map is not. Whenever an un-
matched state is found, SSOD-1K is not satisfied. A counter example trace is the
trace from the initial state to the unmatched state. Since the search is based on
BFS, the trace is the shortest path from the initial state to the unmatched state
(line 11 in Algorithm 6).
Notice that if c is equivalent to potential map, and c is not divergent but
potential map is, it is clear that A does not satisfy SSOD-1K. However, the trace
from I up to c is not a counter example, since it is still stuttering equivalent to
the witness trace T . Hence, in this case, state c is treated as a normal state, i.e.,
if c is unchecked, it is still assigned the label potential map, and the algorithm
continues until a real counter example is found (lines 13-15).
Consider a situation that the check hits a state c that has been checked
before, , if c ∼V potential map but Map[c] 6= potential map, we consider c is
an abnormal checked state, denoted abnormal (lines 16-18). It means that there
exist at least two traces that both lead to abnormal ; and abnormal corresponds
to two different states of T . Notice that one of them hits abnormal via current ,
thus we denote current as pre abnormal .
Figure 3 explains this situation. According to the algorithm, state 1 and state
2 are both mapped to u1. Next, state 4 is also mapped to u1, since it follows
state 1 via a stuttering step. In this check, we store parent [state 4] = state 1.
Next, the algorithm examines the successor of state 2, i.e., state 3, and maps
state 3 to u2; since this is a non-stuttering transition, and state 3 is equivalent
to u2.
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When the algorithm examines the successor of state 3, which is state 4, the
potential map is u3; since this is a non-stuttering transition. However, state 4
has been explored before, and its current assigned label is u1. Since the current
label of state 4 is different from potential map, but state 4 is still equivalent to
potential map, then state 4 is an abnormal checked state. Notice that if state
4 and potential map are not equivalent, state 4 is an unmatched state. State 3
is the pre abnormal state, since in this check, state 4 is its successor. However,
parent [state 4] still indicates that state 1 is the parent of state 4, i.e., referring
to the step of checking the successor of state 1.
When an abnormal is found, SSOD-1K is not satisfied. However, neither of
the two traces from init state up to abnormal , e.g., abb and abcb in Figure 3,
is a complete counter example. Actually, one of them is a prefix of a real counter
example. Therefore, the function Trace Return returns two traces: P1 that is
from init state to parent [abnormal ], e.g., P1 = ab, and P2 that is from init state
to pre abnormal , e.g., P2 = abc. The current BFS check is terminated. The new
check starts from abnormal (given by Algorithm 9), in which P1 is extended to a
lasso. In this new check, if an unmatched state is found, we are done; otherwise,
a complete lasso T1 is obtained, i.e., T1 = P1+P3. In Figure 3, T1 = a(bbbc)
ω.
If T1 is not stuttering equivalent to the witness trace T , it is a counter example;
otherwise, the counter example is the lasso T2 that is an extension of P2 + P3.
The reason is that three traces T , T1, and T2 cannot be all stuttering equivalent
to each other. In Figure 3, T1 is the counter example.
If no counter example is found after all reachable states from the initial state
have been explored, SSOD-1K is satisfied.
Algorithm 6: Attack Synthesis for SSOD-1K (A, T )
1. for all states c ∈ S do Map[c] := ⊥;
2. continue := true;
3. Q := empty queue(); enqueue(Q, init state);
4. parent [init state] := root ; // to indicate the start of traces
5. Map[init state] := u0; // u0 is T0
6. while !empty(Q) ∧ continue do
7. current := dequeue(Q);
8. u := Map[current ];
9. for all states c ∈ Succ(A, current) do
10. potential map := (c ∼V current) ? u : Succ(T, u);
11. Unmatched-State Check (c, potential map, current)
12. case
13. [] Map[c] = ⊥  enqueue(Q, c);
14. parent [c] := current ;
15. Map[c] := potential map;
16. [] Map[c] 6= potential map 
17. continue := false;
18. Abnormal-State Check (current , c);
19. return continue;
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The function Unmatched-State Check (c, potential map, current) returns
a counter example if c is an unmatched state.
Algorithm 7: Unmatched-State Check (c, potential map, current)
if c 6∼V potential map or
Divergent [c] = true ∧Divergent [potential map] = false then
parent [c] := current ;
continue := false;
Counter Example = Trace Return(init state, c);
The function Trace Return (a, b) returns a finite trace from state a to state
b. Notice that the stack trace stores the trace backwards, i.e., a is the last element
that enters the stack.
Algorithm 8: Trace Return (a, b)
trace := empty stack(); // trace is a stack
PUSH (trace, b); // Add an item to the stack
parent value := parent [b];
while parent value 6= parent [a] do
PUSH(trace, parent value);
parent value := parent [parent value];
while !empty(trace) do
return POP (trace); // Remove an item from the top of the stack
The function Abnormal-State Check (pre abnormal , abnormal) returns a
counter example when an abnormal state is found.
Algorithm 9: Abnormal-State Check (pre abnormal , abnormal)
Let P1 = Trace Return(init state, parent [abnormal ]);
Let P2 = Trace Return(init state, pre abnormal);
// Except states on P1, erase the labels and parents of other states
for all states c ∈ S ∧ c /∈ P1 do
Map[c] := ⊥;
parent [c] := ⊥;
// The new check starts from abnormal
current := abnormal ;
u := Map[abnormal ];
c := some state ∈ Succ(A, current);
// Extend P1 to a lasso
while Map[c] = ⊥ do
potential map := (c ∼V current) ? u : Succ(T, u);
// if an unmatched state is found, we are done
Unmatched-State Check (c, potential map, current);
parent [c] := current ;
Map[c] := potential map;
current := c;
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u := potential map
c := some state ∈ Succ(A, current)
// Return T1 if it is not stuttering equivalent to T
if Map[c] 6= potential map then
Counter Example = P1 + Trace Return(abnormal , c);
// Return T2 if T1 is stuttering equivalent to T
if Map[c] = potential map then
if c ∈ P1 then
Counter Example = P2 + Trace Return(abnormal , c) +
Trace Return(c, abnormal);
else Counter Example = P2 + Trace Return(abnormal , c);
Notice that in case c ∈ P1, P2 + Trace Return(abnormal , c) is not a com-
plete lasso (see Figure 3 for a visual example), a counter example should be P2
+ Trace Return(abnormal , c) + Trace Return(c, abnormal).
Theorem 5. In case a Kripke structure A does not satisfy SSOD-1K, Algorithm
6 returns a trace that is not stuttering equivalent to the witness trace T .
Proof. Algorithm 6 is a variant of Algorithm 4 whose correctness has been
proved. Here we show that the algorithm produces a correct counter example.
Case c 6∼V potential map. It is clear that the trace from init state to c is an
counter example.
Case Divergent [c] = true and Divergent [potential map] = false. Since c is a di-
vergent state, there exists a trace that goes from init state to c, and then
stutters in c forever. State potential map is not divergent, thus, it is not the
final state of T . Since T is stuttering-free, it can evolve to a state that is not
equivalent to potential map. Therefore, the trace from init state to c is an
counter example.
Otherwise,. Let P1 = Trace Return (init state, parent [abnormal ]), and
P2 = Trace Return (init state, pre abnormal). Let T1 denote a lasso that
is an extension of P1 from abnormal , i.e., T1 = P1 + P3, where P3 is the
extension. While extending P1, if an unmatched state is found, we are done.
Otherwise, when the lasso T1 is complete, i.e., when Map[c] 6= ⊥, one of the
two following scenarios occurs.
Case Map[c] 6= potential map. T1 is not stuttering equivalent to T , since c
corresponds to two different states of T .
Case Map[c] = potential map. It is clear that T1 is stuttering equivalent to
a prefix of T , i.e., the prefix up to potential map. We show that T1 is
actually stuttering equivalent to the whole T . Given that c has been
checked before, then c is the start and end of a loop that terminates the
lasso T1.
Case c is not divergent. Since c is mapped to potential map twice,
potential map is also the start and end of a loop that terminates T .
Thus T1 ∼ T .
22
Case c is a divergent state. Thus, potential map is also divergent.
Therefore, potential map is the final state of T ; then T1 ∼ T .
Let T2 denote an extension of P2 +P3 to a lasso. Since T is deterministic
stuttering-free, and abnormal is mapped to two different states of T , T1
and T2 cannot be both stuttering equivalent to T . Since T1 ∼ T , T2 is
the counter example. 
5.2 Attack Synthesis for SSOD-2K
Given two deterministic stuttering-free Kripke structures R and R′, if R and
R′ do not satisfy SSOD-2K, Algorithm 10 outputs a trace of R that does not
match with any trace of R′, or vice versa.
It is clear that for R and R′, any two strongly bisimilar states must be in the
same block. We denote a couple of states of R and R′ to be valid if they have
the same label, but they are not in the same block of the stable partition P given
by the algorithm that computes bisimularity equivalence classes in Section 4.2.
Given a valid couple (c, c′) (c ∈ SR, c′ ∈ SR′ , where SR, SR′ are state sets
of R and R′, respectively), similarly, two successors of (c, c′) are also valid if
they have the same label, but they are not strongly bisimilar. Therefore, from
an initial state, a counter example trace must pass states in a sequence of valid
couples until it hits a state such that the other trace (from the other initial state)
cannot find a successor to form a valid couple. The shortest counter example
trace is found based on BFS.
Given two valid states c ∈ SR and c′ ∈ SR′ . Let SameBlock(c, c′) be a
predicate to check whether c and c′ are in the same block of the given partition,
i.e., SameBlock (c, c′) {return (∃Q ∈ P. c ∈ Q ∧ c′ ∈ Q)}. We formally define
Valid (c, c′) {return (c ∈ SR∧ c′ ∈ SR′ ∧V (c) = V (c′)∧¬SameBlock (c, c′)},
and the set Valid Succ(c, c′) of valid successors of (c, c′) as follows,
Valid Succ(c, c′) = {(d, d′) | c ∈ SR, c′ ∈ SR′ . c→ d, c′ → d′ ∧Valid (d, d′)}.
We also define a predicate Unmatched Succ on a valid couple (c, c′) to (1)
check whether either c or c′ can take a transition to a state d such that none of
the other state’s successors is equivalent to d, and to (2) return d, if d exists.
Formally,
Unmatched Succ (c, c′) {
if ( c→ d ∧ @d′ ∈ SR′ . c′ → d′ ∧ V (c′) = V (c)) then return (d)
if ( c′ → d′ ∧ @d ∈ SR. c→ d ∧ V (c) = V (c′)) then return (d′) }
Therefore, given the stable partition P, the following algorithm explores the
state spaces and returns the first state given by Unmatched Succ.
Algorithm 10: Invalid-State Search (P)
QR[0] := initial state of R;
parentR[QR[0]] := root ;
QR′ [0] := initial state of R′;
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parentR′ [QR′ [0]] := root ;
i := 0; // i: position of the latest items in both QR and QR′
while (true) do
Unmatched Succ (QR[i],QR′ [i]);
for each (c, c′) ∈ Valid Succ(QR′ [i],QR′ [i]) do
QR[i+ 1] := c;
parentR[QR[i+ 1]] := QR[i];
QR′ [i+ 1] := c′;
parentR′ [QR′ [i+ 1]] := QR′ [i];
i := i+ 1;
Then Parent Return outputs the trace from the initial state up to the state
returned by the algorithm.
Theorem 6. In case R and R′ do not satisfy SSOD-2K, Algorithm 10 returns
a trace of R that does not match with any trace of R′, or vice versa.
Proof. Two queues QR and QR′ store couples of valid successors reachable from
two initial states. When the first unmatched state is found, the trace from the
initial state to this state is returned. Due to BFS, this trace is one of the shortest
paths from the initial state to it.
Notice that in case no state is returned by Unmatched Succ (QR[i],QR′ [i]),
for each successor of QR[i], there must exist a successor of QR′ [i] such that these
two states have the same label, or vice versa. If none of these couples is valid, i.e.,
two states of any couple are bisimilar, then QR[i] and QR′ [i] are also bisimilar.
This is a contradiction, since QR[i] and QR′ [i] are a valid couple. Thus, the
set Valid Succ(QR[i],QR′ [i]) is not empty; and the algorithm continues until an
unmatched state is found. 
Now, we have to derive the original traces of A that correspond to the trace
of R given by Algorithm 10; since these original traces are the real counter
examples.
Derive the original traces of A from a trace of R. Suppose that R
is the corresponding deterministic Kripke structure of the stuttering-free Asf .
We define a relation Re between a transition of Asf and a transition of R,
i.e., Re ⊆→Asf × →R as follows. Let trn denote a transition, source(trn) and
dest(trn) the source and the destination state of trn.
∀trn ∈→Asf , trn ′ ∈→R . trn Re trn ′ ⇔ V (source(trn)) = V (source(trn ′)) ∧
V (dest(trn)) = V (dest(trn ′)).
Given a trace T of R, the following algorithm derives a set Trace(T ) = {T ′}
of Asf corresponding to T . Let N denote the number of transitions in T . We
rewrite T as an array of N transitions, i.e., T = T [0], T [1], . . . , T [N − 1], where
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T [i] = (Ti, Ti+1). We implement an array States of size N+1, where each element
States[i] is a set of states of Asf , i.e., States[i] ⊆ SAsf .
Algorithm 11: Trace Map (T )
States[0] := initial state of Asf ;
for i := 1 to N do
States[i] := {c′ ∈ SAsf | ∃c ∈ States[i− 1]. c→Asf c′ ∧ (c, c′) Re T [i− 1]};
for each c ∈ States[N ] do
current := c;
for i := N − 1 to 0 do
Take c′ ∈ States[i] ∧ (c′, current) Re T [i];
T ′[i] := (c′, current);
current := c′;
Traces of A can be derived easily, since we assumed that states are numbered
and the transition relation between states is accessible.
6 Related Work
The idea of observational determinism originates from the notion of noninterfer-
ence, which only considers the leakages in the final states of program traces. We
refer to [34, 24] for a more detailed description of noninterference, its verification,
and a discussion why it is not appropriate for multi-threaded programs.
Roscoe [33] was the first to state the importance of determinism to ensure
secure information flow of multi-threaded programs. Intuitively, observational
determinism expresses that a multi-threaded program is secure when its pub-
licly observable traces are independent of its confidential data. In the literature,
many formal definitions have been proposed [44, 24, 39], but none of these earlier
definitions captures exactly this intuition.
The first formal definition of observational determinism was proposed by
Zdancewic and Myers [44]. It states that a program is observationally deter-
ministic iff given any two initial low-equivalent states, any two traces of each
low variable are equivalent up to stuttering and prefixing. Zdancewic and Myers
only consider traces of each single low variable. They also argue that prefixing
is a sufficiently strong relation, as this only causes external termination leaks of
one bit of information [44]. In 2006, Huisman, Worah and Sunesen showed that
allowing termination leaks might reveal more than one bit of information. Thus,
they strengthened the definition of observational determinism by requiring that
traces of each low variable must be stuttering equivalent [24]. In 2008, Terauchi
showed that an attacker might derive secret information by observing the rela-
tive order of low variable updates [39]. Therefore, he proposed another variant
of observational determinism, requiring that all traces should be equivalent up
to stuttering and prefixing w.r.t. all low variables. The main difference between
this definition and the two previous ones is that instead of dealing with each low
variable separately, this one considers all of them together. However, Terauchi’s
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definition still accepts programs that reveal secret information. Moreover, it re-
jects too many innocuous programs, since it requires the complete set of low
variables to evolve in a deterministic way [23].
Besides, these definitions of observational determinism claim that they are
scheduler-independent. However, in [23], we show that this claim is not cor-
rect. SSOD is the only one to consider the effect of schedulers on confidentiality.
In [23], we also discuss the properties of SSOD, and claim that SSOD approxi-
mates the intuitive notion of security more precisely than the earlier definitions of
observational determinism, which either accept insecure programs, or are overly
restrictive. In [23], we also propose a definition of scheduler-independent obser-
vational determinism. We show that given the uniform scheduler, for any two
initial low-equivalent states I and I ′, if all possible traces starting in I and I ′
are stuttering equivalent w.r.t. all low variables, this program is secure under
any scheduling policy.
Mantel et al. [28] also consider the effect of schedulers on confidentiality.
However, their observational model is different from ours. They assume that the
attacker can only observe the initial and final values of low variables on traces.
Thus, their definitions of confidentiality are noninterference-like.
SSOD is a possibilistic secure information flow property: it only considers the
nondeterminism that is possible in an execution, but it does not consider the
probability that an execution will happen. When a scheduler’s behavior is prob-
abilistic, some threads might be executed more often than others, which opens
up the possibility of a probabilistic attack. To prevent information leakage under
probabilistic attacks, several notions of probabilistic noninterference have been
proposed, e.g., by Volpano et al., Sabelfeld and Sands, and Smith [42, 35, 37].
However, in [30], we show that these definitions have limitations. We introduce
the notion of scheduler-specific probabilistic observational determinism (SSPOD),
together with an algorithmic technique to verify it. Basically, a program respects
SSPOD if (SSPOD-1) for any initial state, each public variable individually be-
haves deterministically with probability 1, and (SSPOD-2) for any two initial
low-equivalent states I and I ′, for every trace starting in I, there exists a trace
that is stuttering equivalent w.r.t. all public variables, starting in I ′, and the
probabilities of these two matching traces are the same. This definition extends
SSOD, and makes it usable in a larger context.
Sabelfeld and Sands’s definition of probabilistic noninterference also takes
into account the role of schedulers on confidentiality [35]. This definition is
based on a probabilistic low-bisimulation, which requires that given any two
initial low-equivalent states, for any trace that starts in an initial state, there
exists a trace that starts in the other initial state and passes through the same
equivalence classes of states at the same time, with the same probability. This
definition is too restrictive w.r.t. timing, i.e., it cannot accommodate threads
whose running time depends on high variables. Thus, it rejects many harm-
less programs, while our definitions, both SSOD and SSPOD, accept, such as
if (h > 0) then {l1 := 3; l1 := 3; l2 := 4} else {l1 := 3; l2 := 4}.
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To overcome the restriction on timing, Smith proposes to use a weak prob-
abilistic bisimulation [37]. Weak probabilistic bisimulation allows two traces to
be equivalent when they reach the same outcome, but one runs slower than the
other. However, this still demands that any two bisimilar states must reach in-
distinguishable states with the same probability. This probabilistic condition of
bisimulation is more restrictive than SSPOD.
Notice that all bisimulation-based definitions mentioned above do not require
the deterministic behavior of each low variable. However, we insist that a multi-
threaded program must enforce a deterministic orderings on the accesses to low
variables, see [23].
Palamidessi et al., Chen et al., Smith, and Zhu et al. [2–4, 12, 38, 45], and also
we [29] investigate a quantitative notion of information leakage for probabilistic
systems. Quantitative analysis offers a method to compute bounds on how much
information is leaked. This information can be used to compare with the thresh-
old, and thus suggesting whether the program is accepted or not. Therefore, we
can tolerate the minor leakage. Thus, this line of researches is complementary
to this work.
To verify confidentiality, Zdancewic and Myers, Sabelfeld and Sands, Ter-
auchi, Smith, and Kobayashi [44, 35, 39, 37, 25] use type systems. As discussed
in [23], type systems are not suited to verify existential properties, as the one
in SSOD and SSPOD. Besides, type systems that have been proposed to en-
force confidentiality for multi-threaded programs are often very restrictive. This
restrictiveness makes the application programming become impractical; many
intuitively secure programs are rejected by this approach, i.e., h := l; l := h.
Recently, dynamic monitoring is emerging as an approach to gain better
precision than type systems [27, 36, 43, 19]. This approach follows the precise
control flow of a program, and thus, calculation of control dependences can be
more accurate. However, this approach is often runtime overhead.
Huisman et al. use a different approach [24] based on self-composition [7,
15], and in particular, on the temporal logic characterization of non-interference
by Barthe et al. Developing a temporal logic characterization allows to use a
standard model checker to verify the information flow property. Huisman et al.
characterize observational determinism in CTL*, using a special non-standard
synchronous composition operator, and also in the polyadic modal µ-calculus (a
variation of the modal µ-calculus) [24]. In an attempt to make the result more
generally applicable, Huisman and Ngo [23, 22] characterize stuttering equiva-
lence as a conjunction of an LTL and a CTL formula. However, the result is
still a complicated formula, where states have to maintain a queue of the dif-
ference in changes between two threads, and actually using a model checker to
verify this is not realistic. Therefore, in this paper, instead of giving a tempo-
ral logic characterization, we propose to use algorithmic techniques. This has
an additional advantage that we can use the negative results of the algorithms
to generate attacks. It should be also stressed that our algorithmic verification
techniques could easily be adapted to verify other formalizations of observational
27
determinism, including our scheduler-independent definition in [23], since they
are all based on stuttering equivalence.
Giffhorn et al. [17] propose a verification method based on program depen-
dence graphs to check observational determinism. Program dependence graph
models information flow through a program where nodes are program state-
ments, and edges are data dependences or control dependences. Their definition
of observational determinism is similar to our definition of scheduler-independent
observational determinism [23]. However, in their approach, there is no global
security classification of variables, i.e., a variable at one program point may con-
tain a low value, but at another point a high value. Thus, their trace definition is
based on low operations, i.e., read or write on a low variable, instead of low val-
ues as in the traditional approaches. This work also allows prefixing if traces are
finite. This verification method has a rather high time complexity, i.e., O(n3),
while our algorithm to check all-trace stuttering equivalence has a linear time
complexity in the size of the graph modeling the program.
Alur et al. [1] enrich the traditional tree model with labeled edges that cap-
ture observational indistinguishability between nodes. This enriched model is
expressive enough to specify information flow properties in temporal logics. In
later work, Cˇerny´ and Alur [41] then consider a weaker class of properties, so-
called conditional confidentiality properties, and develop a sound automated
analysis for this, based on a combination of under- and over-approximations.
The practical impact of this work is illustrated by applying it on Java2ME.
However, their properties are for sequential programs, i.e., they do not consider
multiple threads. Finally, Van der Meyden and Zhang [40] develop algorithmic
verification techniques on state-based models for a number of different noninter-
ference notions, and characterize the computational complexity of the associated
verification problems.
7 Conclusion
Summary. This paper discusses the efficient verification of scheduler-specific
observational determinism. This formalization captures the intuitive idea of ob-
servational determinism more precisely than other formalizations in the litera-
ture, i.e., a program is accepted by SSOD, no secret information can be derived
from the publicly observable traces and the relative order of updates of low vari-
ables. The verification uses a combination of new and existing algorithms. The
new algorithm solves a standard problem, i.e., checking all-trace stuttering equiv-
alence and stuttering trace equivalence of Kripke structures, which makes them
applicable also in a broader context. The advantage of using model checking al-
gorithms is that they can generate counter examples when the verification fails.
We extend our algorithms for this purpose, i.e., presenting counter examples to
synthesize information leaking attacks.
Future work. The implementation of our verification algorithms has been done
in the symbolic model checker LTSmin [10]. Currently, we are applying the tool
to case studies.
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As future work, we would like to understand if the verification algorithms can
be further optimized for particular classes of schedulers, e.g., for all round robin
schedulers. We also would like to run the attack synthesis for scheduler, i.e., find
a set of schedulers that might break the confidentiality of a given program.
Finally, we believe that the same approach of adapting existing model check-
ing algorithms will also be appropriate to efficiently and precisely verify other
security properties, such as integrity and availability.
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